00Identity verification

The State's signature, not an opinion on a photo.

We open the chip of the electronic identity card and the passport, and verify on our own server the signature of the State that issued them. When there is no chip, we say so in the result instead of pretending it is the same thing.

A woman in a white blazer, sitting at a café table, looks at the phone she is holding in both hands.

Case outcome

ver_7f3a91c4

Approved
Document
Electronic identity card
MRZ check digits
All add up
Tax code
Recomputed from the MRZ
Liveness
Passed
Face similarity
96 / 100
Issue date
To be confirmed
proven or measured only read, to be confirmed
No refusal is automatic, and no approval is unless you switch it on

Compliance

  • ISO/IEC 27001:2022

    GREM S.R.L.'s information security, covering the development and production of SaaS solutions

    ours

  • ISO/IEC 27017:2015

    Security controls for cloud services, an extension of GREM S.R.L.'s 27001

    ours

  • ISO/IEC 30107-3

    Anti-spoofing, Levels 1 and 2, NIST-accredited laboratory

    liveness component

  • GDPR

    The customer is the controller, we are the processor. Appointed under Art. 28

    compliance

  • Data in Ireland

    Document, face and images on AWS in Ireland, eu-west-1. Anyone else who touches the data is listed on the sub-processors page

    architecture

01What it does

Four checks, and nothing else

The scope is narrow by choice. We do these four things well and stay out of decisions that are not ours to make.
The document
Electronic identity card and passport. The machine-readable zone is decoded and every ICAO check digit recomputed; on the CIE we also recompute the check character of the tax code (codice fiscale), and from it we decode the municipality of birth. The driving licence is read from its front, but it has no machine-readable zone: its fields remain readings, and the case says so field by field.

Front and back must belong to the same card: the comparison is only possible because one of the two sides is certain.

Liveness
A guided sequence in the browser establishes that a real person is in front of the camera, at that moment: not a photograph, not a screen, not a recorded video.

We read the result from the service ourselves. What the browser claims is not proof: a client that certifies its own success is a client an attacker controls.

Face match
The face captured live is compared with the photograph printed on the document and returns a similarity from 0 to 100, which orders the review queue.

It stops the most common fraud, the one liveness alone is blind to: a real person showing someone else's document.

The lists
The established identity is checked against sanctions lists, politically exposed persons and criminal watchlists. It happens on its own at the end of every verification, not on request.

The provider returns a binary result, and for a common surname it comes back with sixteen namesakes. The score that ranks them is ours, and no threshold removes a hit from the table: a sanctioned person dismissed by a number we made up ourselves is not something you can explain to a supervisory authority.

What we don't do. No verification of legal entities, no transaction monitoring, no risk profiling. No search for a face among other customers' faces: verification is always one-to-one, and that keeps the system outside Annex III of the AI Act. On the lists we give you the hits and their assessment: the customer due diligence decision stays with your institution.

02How it works

How it works

From opening the case to the outcome, four steps. The third is automatic; a person does the fourth, unless you switch on automatic approval for cases green on every check.
Screen of the verification page on a phone: the consent request, with the name of whoever is asking for the verification, what the images are used for and who the data controller is.

01 Consent

Who is asking, why, and who the data controller is: before any photo

Screen of the document step on a phone: the frame for the front of the card, with the hint to bring it closer.

02 The document

The camera takes the shot by itself when it is in focus

Drawing

03 The chip

Hold the document to the phone: we read the State's signature

Drawing

04 The face

A live person, compared with the signed portrait

Consent and document are real screens of the verification page. Chip and face are drawn: capturing them would take a real document and a real face.

  1. 1

    Open the case and mint the link

    From the dashboard or with an API call you create the verification, then mint a single-use link that expires. They are two separate resources: the case lasts and carries the decision, the link does not.

    A link that is generated and never opened is not charged.

  2. 2

    The person verifies

    They open the link on their phone, give consent — recorded with date, text version and IP address — photograph the document and pass the liveness check.

    No account to create. Reading the chip requires our app: no browser can talk NFC to a document, and on iOS it is simply not possible.

  3. 3

    The automated checks

    Document reading, check digits, liveness and face match. What the person can fix — a blurry photo, a glare, the back of a different card — comes back straight away, saying what to redo.

    If one of our checks is unreachable we say so, and we tell them without blaming their document: the attempt remains valid and nothing is charged to you.

  4. 4

    A person decides

    Your team — or one of our operators, on the Institutional plan — looks at the document and the face side by side and picks the reason from a closed list. If you switch on automatic approval, cases green on every check are approved on their own: with the chip, or from the photograph too if you choose to accept its limits; refusals always stay with a person. The outcome reaches your signed webhook and stays readable via the API.

    Every time a case is opened, it is recorded in an access log.

Retrying means minting a new link on the same case: the previous one dies.

"Expired" and "needs a retry" also arrive as events: you don't have to poll to find out.

Dashboard · Settings
Dashboard screen, Settings page: the number of days photos are kept, the liveness and face similarity thresholds, and automatic approval, switched off.
Retention, thresholds and automatic approval are set from the dashboard. Automatic approval stays off until you switch it on.
03Who it's for

Who it's for

Anyone who is required to know who the person on the other side of the screen is, and doesn't want to build a biometric pipeline in-house to get there.
Four professionals in jackets talk around a table in a bright office, with a tablet and papers in front of them.
Banks and payment institutions
Remote onboarding. We collect and verify identification data and the face match; customer due diligence, risk profiling and retention remain your decisions.
Fintechs and lenders
Verification before disbursement or card activation, with a readable reason when it is a rejection and the thresholds applied frozen on the decision.
Marketplaces and platforms
Sellers and professionals verified before their first payout, without building a biometric pipeline in-house and without storing faces on your own servers.
Trust services and electronic signatures
Remote identification of the signer before the certificate is issued, with documented evidence of how it was carried out.
04Reliability

Why trust the result

A verification provider is judged by what it admits it doesn't know. Here is where our answer is proven and where it is only measured.
ver_7f3a91c4Needs reviewSigned by the State, and genuineReviewed by M. Bianchi

Evidence

Liveness

99.6 / 100

Face similarity

97.4 / 100

Identity

Surname
ROSSI
Given name
MARIO
Date of birth
14/03/1985
Tax code
RSSMRA85C14F839K
Place of birth
Napoli (NA)
Document number
CA12345XY

Lists

ROSSI MARIO GIUSEPPE

EU Consolidated

41 / 100Dismissed

ROSSI M.

PEP — Italy

22 / 100Dismissed

No hit is hidden by a threshold.

Check digits are arithmetic, not a guess

The machine-readable zone carries ICAO check digits: if the reading is wrong, the numbers don't add up — instead of arriving as plausible, false data. That is why we tell a proven field apart from a field that was only read, and tell you which is which.

In practice

On a real card the surname read from the front was "BRNV" — the vertical text of the hologram. The MRZ on the back said "ROSSI".

A person decides every refusal

No refusal comes from a machine. Whoever decides — your team, or one of our operators on the Institutional plan — sees the document and the face side by side and picks the reason from a closed list: no free-text boxes on data that is kept for years. Only if you choose it, cases green on every check are approved without review by a person — with the chip signed by the State or, if you accept that separately, from the photograph alone too — and the case says that is how it went.

In practice

The role that accesses biometric data is separate from everything else, so it can be revoked on its own. Every time a case is opened, it is recorded in a log the customer cannot delete.

Data stays in Europe

Processing on AWS in Ireland, region eu-west-1, and the application in Germany; only the name goes to screening, in Switzerland, a country with an adequacy decision. We don't train models on customer data: it would make us a controller and we would need our own legal basis for biometric data.

In practice

Document photos and liveness frames live on a short clock: they die when the case is closed and in any case within 30 days of capture, even if the case was abandoned.

We don't ask you to trust a score: every case carries the thresholds in force that day, who decided — your team, one of our operators or your automatic approval rule — and the reason chosen from a closed list. That is what you need to answer a supervisory authority six months from now.

05The boundary

Where our job ends

It is the first question your compliance team will ask, so we put it on the page instead of at the bottom of a contract.

What we do

  • We perform the technical verification: document reading, liveness, face match.
  • We return the data read, the outcome and the measurements that make it reproducible six months from now.
  • We retain data according to the setting you choose, within a maximum set by the product.
  • We act as processor under Art. 28 GDPR, with declared sub-processors.

What stays with your institution

  • You are the obliged entity: technology providers do not appear in the list in Art. 3 of Italian Legislative Decree 231/2007.
  • You decide customer due diligence and the risk profile. Our outcome is one input, not the decision.
  • You choose how long to retain and tell us when the relationship ends: the clock starts from there, and you are the one who knows that date.
  • You offer the non-biometric alternative on your own channels — SPID, qualified electronic signature, in-person identification.

We don't say "we do KYC for you", because it isn't true and it shows immediately in a due diligence. We don't issue the Art. 27 attestation and we never decide an erasure request: we forward it to the controller, which is you.

06Pricing

Pricing

Pay per verification, per module. No fee and no minimum: the way we count is written here, and the price list is public.

A link never opened is free

You pay when the person completes the verification, not when you generate the link.

Retrying does not charge twice

Each module is paid once per case: a second attempt is not a second verification.

A refusal is charged

It is still work done: the document was read, the face compared, the lists queried.

From €0.33 per verification, at most €0.68 with chip and screening. Top up your balance by card and use it whenever you like; human review by our operators is in the Institutional plan.

See prices and plans
07For integrators

Two calls to get started

The case and the link are separate resources, and not out of taste: the case lasts and carries the decision, the link is single-use and expires. Whether you can retry is told by an HTTP status code, not by a note in the documentation.
Dashboard · API reference
Screen of the API reference in the dashboard: authentication with the key in the header, and the five steps of the flow.
The API reference lives in the dashboard, and its examples already point at your installation.
API
POST /api/v1/verifications
  → { "id": "01994c1e-9d33-7b4e-8a12-6c7f0e5b9a41", "status": "created" }

POST /api/v1/verifications/01994c1e-…/attempts
  → { "url": "https://…/v/9a7f…", "expires_at": "…" }

# the same attempt on a case that has already been decided
  → 409 Conflict

Test and live keys, kept separate

Distinct prefixes, distinct webhooks, and the same checks as the real thing: a test costs us as much as a verification, which is why we give away a fixed number each month.

Signed webhooks, with durable retries

The delivery queue is a table, not an in-memory loop: a deploy in the middle of a delivery loses nothing.

Payloads without personal data

The event carries an identifier; the data is read with an authenticated call, when needed.

Idempotency in plain sight

Every event carries a stable identifier, which is the idempotency key for the receiver.

08Questions

Frequently asked questions

The four that always come first. The others — retention, the non-biometric alternative, what happens if a person doesn't pass — are on the dedicated page.

Try it with a test key

Create an account, mint a link and see what comes back. The test environment runs the same checks as the real one, so what you see is what you will get. No commitment before you have seen an outcome.
Two people work at a desk, in front of a monitor and a laptop, in a bright office.